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COMPLIMENTARY DISCRIMINATION AND 
COMPLEMENTARY DISCRIMINATION IN 
FACULTY HIRING 
ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG

 
ABSTRACT 
This Article focuses on one form of discrimination in faculty hiring. 
Specifically, this Article concentrates on discrimination against the 
“overqualified” minority faculty candidate, the candidate who is 
presumed to have too many opportunities and thus gets excluded from 
faculty interview lists and consideration. In so doing, this Article poses 
and answers the question: “Can exclusion from interviewing pools and 
selection based upon the notion that one is just „too good‟ to recruit to a 
particular department constitute an actionable form of discrimination?” 
Part I of this Article begins by briefly reviewing the changes in faculty 
diversity and inclusion at colleges and universities. Part II lays out a 
hypothetical of a superstar, bidding-war minority faculty candidate in 
English and explicates how the exclusion of this candidate, although 
accompanied by high praise and not racial animus, may constitute 
actionable discrimination. In so doing, it examines how federal courts 
have analyzed the concept of “overqualification” when employers have 
articulated it as the reason for not hiring a job applicant in discrimination 
lawsuits. It then explains why the myth of the “overqualified” minority 
faculty candidate as the “highly sought-after” candidate can render that 
candidate‟s exclusion from interviews, and thus hiring, a unique and 
specific form of racial discrimination. Part III further explicates how this 
form of “complimentary discrimination” works to create the 
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“complementary discrimination” of keeping other “less qualified,” but 
certainly qualified minorities locked out of the academic market or out of 
particular schools. Specifically, it explains how faculties‟ dreams of one 
day recruiting the superstar minority candidate—generally the only type 
of minority candidate whom they truly find acceptable—can function as an 
excuse for not “settling” for racial minority candidates who are well 
qualified, but not as highly credentialed as the superstars, which, in turn, 
continues the cycle of low representation of minorities on college and 
university faculties. To illustrate this point, this Part details a hypothetical 
involving a minority female candidate on the entry level market in law. 
The Conclusion of this Article then expresses and details the need for and 
importance of increasing diversity on college and university faculties in 
today‟s society and the importance of carefully evaluating one‟s own 
biases when creating and serving on faculty search committees. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Faculty hiring at colleges and universities
1
 can be a messy process. 
Although there are arguably objective criteria for evaluating applicants 
 
 
 1. Although the concepts in this Article apply to all departments, including law schools, the 
primary hypothetical in this Article, see infra Part II.A, addresses and focuses on application processes 
that greatly differ from the process offered to law faculty candidates through the Association of 
American Law Schools‘ (AALS) Faculty Appointments Register (FAR). For example, unlike the 
hypothetical faculty candidate in Part II.A, the average faculty candidate in law would not have limited 
his applications and thus his opportunities to just a few schools; generally, entry-level law candidates 
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during the appointments process,
2
 faculties generally make their final 
decisions on offers among qualified candidates based on subjective 
criteria, such as speculations about a candidate‘s future productivity and 
teaching effectiveness. Is the candidate a good fit for the department? Will 
he or she be a productive scholar for years to come? How will the 
institution‘s students respond to the candidate as a teacher? 
When faculties add factors of diversity, especially racial diversity, to 
the mix of their hiring considerations, the responses to these questions can 
become even stickier. For candidates who are on the margins, such as 
racial minorities, questions regarding whether the candidate is a good fit 
are less likely to work to their advantage.
3
 Majority faculty members often 
find it hard to imagine minority candidates engaged in future discussions 
of politics and current events during the lunch hour in the faculty lounge.
4
 
Majority faculty members also experience difficulty in seeing such 
candidates as younger versions of themselves, ready to carry on the 
 
 
use the FAR, which makes their applications accessible to every law school in the United States. 
Ilyhung Lee, The Rookie Season, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 473, 474 n.2 (1999). 
 2. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo‟s Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. L.J. 
1711, 1718–19 (1995) (arguing that merit ―is a resource attractor,‖ ―that the pre-existing level of merit 
may be skewed, and that supposedly neutral mechanisms prevent us from seeing this‖); Caroline 
Sotello Viernes Turner, Before Starting a Faculty Search, Take a Good Look at the Search Committee, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 29, 2006, at B32, available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v53/ 
i06/06b03201.htm (critiquing the use of an applicant‘s graduate school as an objective qualification in 
light of racial and ethnic disparities in enrollment in elite programs); see also Smith et al., Interrupting 
the Usual: Successful Strategies for Hiring Diverse Faculty, J. HIGHER EDUC., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 
133, 136–37 (asserting that ―‗informal systems of preference still mold much of American life, and 
take marked importance over merit‘‖); Caroline Sotello Viernes Turner et al., Exploring 
Underrepresentation: The Case of Faculty of Color in the Midwest, J. HIGHER EDUC., Jan.–Feb. 1999, 
at 27, 31 [hereinafter Sotello Viernes Turner et al., Midwest] (expressing doubt about how merit is 
quantified). 
 3. For example, as one tenured American Indian male professor declared, ―‗Mainstream 
students look at minority professors in a different light. . . . Not looking like a mainstream instructor 
naturally tends to work against you.‘‖ Sotello Viernes Turner et al., Midwest, supra note 2, at 43. 
Professor Patricia Williams eloquently described one interaction, in which students highlighted their 
own perception about how she was treated differently as a result of her race and gender. She wrote: 
Two students come to visit me in the wake of the evaluations, my scores having been 
published in the student newspaper. They think the response has to do with race and gender, 
and with the perceived preposterousness of the authority that I, as the first black woman ever 
to have taught at this particular institution, symbolically and imagistically bring to bear in and 
out of the classroom. Breaking out of this, they say, is something we all suffer as pawns in a 
hierarchy, but it is particularly aggravated in the confusing, oxymoronic hierarchic 
symbology of me as a black female law professor. 
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 97 (1991). 
 4. See Sotello Viernes Turner, supra note 2, at B32 (noting that faculty members generally 
―want to work with people who feel familiar to them‖); see also Stephanie M. Wildman, Integration in 
the 1980s: The Dream of Diversity and the Cycle of Exclusion, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1625, 1644 (1990) 
(suggesting that some faculty resist diversity in faculty hiring because they will not be comfortable 
with a minority). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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department‘s traditions.5 In some cases, a minority candidate‘s questions 
about issues of diversity and inclusion on campus can work to raise flags 
about him or her as a potential troublemaker, someone who may disrupt 
the collegiality among the faculty with controversial ―side‖ issues.6 
Similarly, questions about a minority candidate‘s scholarship or reception 
by students can become tinged by race, especially if the candidate‘s 
scholarship focuses on issues of race and diversity.
7
 
Ultimately, when faculties fail to give an offer to a minority candidate 
at the end of the hiring process, they frequently offer two particular 
excuses. These two reasons are voiced in terms that are at once distinct 
and complementary of one another.  
1. There were no, or hardly any, applications from qualified 
minority candidates to consider.
8
 
 
 
 5. As Caroline Sotello Viernes Turner once explained: 
Many committees create a job description that would attract faculty members much like 
themselves. They advertise the position in publications that people mostly like themselves 
read. They evaluate résumés of people who often resemble themselves, invite three to five 
candidates for campus interviews who—again—are similar to themselves, and then make an 
offer to the person with whom they are most comfortable. Over time that process has 
inevitably resulted in campuses that are more homogeneous than not. 
Sotello Viernes Turner, supra note 2, at B32; see also Wildman, supra note 4, at 1671 (―This subtext 
is about, ‗Will this person fit into our group, fit into our institution, not change it in any way that will 
make me not fit, not hurt my place in the institution in any way?‘ It is a conversation that looks to the 
future because the participant worries, ‗If someone comes who is not like me, will I still be valued at 
this place, at other places, or have other opportunities?‘‖). 
 6. See Sumi Cho, “Unwise,” “Untimely,” and “Extreme”: Redefining Collegial Culture in the 
Workplace and Revaluing the Role of Social Change, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 809 (2006) 
(contending that ―those who transgress the cultural norm of gendered and racial hierarchy appear to be 
‗impolite‘ and ‗uncollegial‘ regardless of history, context, or power relations‖); Perry A. Zirkel, 
Mayberry v. Dees: Collegiality as a Criterion for Faculty Tenure, 12 EDUC. L. REP. 1053, 1059 (1983) 
(arguing that ―collegiality‖ can serve as a subterfuge in academic employment decisions and can 
negatively affect the operation of ―the robust exchange of ideas‖ in colleges and universities). 
 7. See Derrick A. Bell, Diversity and Academic Freedom, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 371, 377 (1993) 
(―Minority law teachers, particularly those of us whose writings are intended to unearth rather than 
entomb racial connections between past and current events, are disturbing to many whites, who 
mistake our refusal to conform for a lack of competence.‖); Sotello Viernes Turner et al., Midwest, 
supra note 2, at 30 (asserting that minority faculty may see ―their work devalued if it focuses on 
minority issues‖); see also DERRICK A. BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN 
ARDENT PROFESSOR 35 (1994) (noting that as a junior professor, he had to ―overcome [Harvard Law 
students‘] apprehension that because [he] was the one black in an otherwise all-white faculty [he] 
might not be competent‖). 
 8. See Michael A. Olivas, The Education of Latino Lawyers: An Essay on Crop Cultivation, 14 
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 117, 133 (1994) (contending that one myth about minorities in academia is 
that there are no qualified minorities and that minorities possess ―unexceptional credentials‖); Smith et 
al., supra note 2, at 134–35 (also identifying as a common faculty excuse the lack of qualified minority 
candidates). Certainly, in a number of fields, there is a serious pipeline problem. For example, in 2004, 
one survey revealed that the number of underrepresented minorities—African Americans, American 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss4/2
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2. There was no point in even trying to interview the few, qualified 
minority candidates on the market because they would never accept 
an offer from the department. These candidates are in such high 
demand that there will be many bidding wars between institutions 
over them.
9
  
According to this usual round of excuses, there are two basic types of 
minority faculty candidates: (1) those who are unqualified for the 
department, and (2) those who are ―overqualified‖ for the department.10 
Usually, academic articles address the disadvantages of the minority 
applicant in the first category—the minority candidate who is deemed 
unqualified or unworthy for hire, in many cases due to conscious or 
unconscious
11
 biases
12
 in the evaluation of applicants. This Article, 
 
 
Indians, and Latinas/os—who earned astronomy doctorates was only 6, physics doctorates was only 
22, and mathematics doctorates was only 29. Ben Gose, The Professoriate Is Increasingly Diverse, But 
That Didn‟t Happen by Accident, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 28, 2007, http://chronicle.com/ 
weekly/v54i05.05b00101.htm; see also Daryl G. Smith & José F. Moreno, Hiring the Next Generation 
of Professors?: Will Myths Remain Excuses?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 29, 2006, at B22, B24, 
available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v53/i06/06b02201.htm (noting that underrepresented 
minority graduate enrollment at the eight doctoral institutions in their study was only 14%, even 
though undergraduate enrollment was 22%); Sotello Viernes Turner et al., Midwest, supra note 2, at 45 
(noting that the most frequently cited obstacle to successful recruitment of faculty of color in their 
study ―was a lack of qualified candidates in all fields of study‖); id. at 27–28, 55 (same). 
 9. Daryl G. Smith, Faculty Diversity When Jobs Are Scarce: Debunking the Myths, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 6, 1996, at B3 (arguing that ―the notion that institutions must engage in ‗bidding 
wars‘ to attract scholars of color‖ is a myth that makes it harder for colleges and universities to 
diversify their faculties); Smith et al., supra note 2, at 135 (―Because of pipeline issues and because of 
the continued limits in the labor market for faculty, many assume that there is a ‗bidding war‘ in which 
faculty of color are sought after over ‗traditional‘ White male faculty.‖); Sotello Viernes Turner et al., 
Midwest, supra note 2, at 27 (asserting that there is the myth that ―because of high demand/low supply, 
minority PhDs are flooded with job offers‖). For example, Professor Smith quoted the following 
passage from a report by a prestigious research university: ―Although a concerted effort has been 
made, small candidate pools and intense competition between top universities has made growth in 
faculty numbers difficult.‖ Smith, supra note 9, at B3. In one study, Professor Smith and her team of 
researchers exposed the falsity behind the myth of the minority, bidding-war candidate. See infra notes 
27–31. 
 10. My use of the term ―overqualified‖ to describe a faculty candidate is not literal. 
―Overqualified‖ in this context really means ―exceptionally qualified.‖ In order to be consistent with 
the language that is used in discrimination cases, however, I use the term ―overqualified‖ as opposed 
to the phrase ―exceptionally qualified.‖  
 11. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1498–528 (2005) 
(discussing the results of multiple psychological studies, which confirm an unconscious bias based on 
race from subjects); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 329–44 (1987) (borrowing from Freudian psychoanalysis 
to construct his theory of unconscious racism); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial 
Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1198–227 (2009) (exploring unconscious 
bias among judges in criminal law cases); see also Catherine Smith, Unconscious Bias and “Outsider 
Interest Convergence, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1077, 1084–88 (2008) (exploring ―how unconscious biases 
prevent marginalized groups from building meaningful coalitions with one another‖); Audrey J. Lee, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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however, concentrates on the concept of the ―overqualified minority 
candidate,‖ the faculty candidate who is presumed to have too many 
opportunities and thus gets excluded from faculty interview lists and 
consideration. Specifically, this Article poses and answers the question: 
―Can this form of complimentary exclusion—exclusion from interviewing 
pools based upon the notion that one is just ‗too good‘ to recruit to a 
particular department—be a form of actionable discrimination?‖ Part I of 
this Article begins by briefly reviewing the changes in faculty diversity 
and inclusion at colleges and universities, both generally and within 
specific fields. Part II lays out a hypothetical of a superstar, bidding-war 
minority candidate and explicates how the exclusion of this candidate, 
although accompanied by high praise, may constitute actionable 
discrimination. In so doing, it examines how federal courts have analyzed 
overqualification when employers have articulated it as the reason for not 
hiring a job applicant in discrimination lawsuits. It then explains why the 
myth of the ―overqualified‖ minority faculty candidate as the ―highly 
sought-after‖ candidate can render his or her exclusion from interviews, 
and thus hiring, a unique and specific form of racial discrimination. Part 
III defines two new terms for these types of discriminatory encounters. 
―Complimentary discrimination‖ refers to the exclusion of superstar 
minority candidates from the interviewing and hiring process based upon 
the myth that their race, coupled with their credentials and ―affirmative 
action,‖ will make them too highly sought after, too difficult to pursue, 
and too expensive to recruit.
13
 ―Complementary discrimination‖ refers to 
the exclusion of qualified minorities who do not fit the superstar profile as 
a result of departments‘ decisions to hold out for the Great 
black/Latino/Asian Pacific American/American Indian Hope and their 
resistance to ―settling‖ for ―lesser‖ minorities. Part III further explicates 
how complimentary discrimination produces complementary 
discrimination. Specifically, it explains how faculties‘ dreams of one day 
recruiting the Great black/Latino/Asian Pacific American/American Indian 
Hope—generally the only type of minority candidate whom they truly find 
acceptable—can function as an excuse for not ―settling‖ for racial minority 
candidates who are well qualified but not ―superstars,‖ an excuse that only 
results in a cycle of low representation of minorities on college and 
 
 
Note, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 481, 482–96 (2005) (discussing the prevalence of unconscious bias). 
 12. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 2, at 1722–30. 
 13. See CAROLINE SOTELLO VIERNES TURNER & SAMUEL L. MYERS, JR., FACULTY OF COLOR IN 
ACADEME: BITTERSWEET SUCCESS 125–26 (2000). 
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university faculties. To illustrate this point, this Part details a hypothetical 
involving a minority female candidate on the entry level market in law. 
This Article concludes by expressing the need for increasing diversity on 
college and university faculties in today‘s society and the importance of 
carefully evaluating one‘s own biases when creating and serving on 
faculty search committees. 
I. A LONG WAY TO GO? 
Although this Article focuses on an analysis of discrimination in 
faculty hiring, it is important to note the progress that American 
institutions of higher education have made in racially and ethnically 
diversifying their faculties. For example, according to the Department of 
Education, there was a 58% increase in the number of racial minorities 
who held full-time faculty positions at colleges and universities in the 
United States between the years 1995 to 2005.
14
 Specifically, the 
percentages of Latina/o and Asian Pacific American faculty grew by 75%, 
each to 22,818 and 48,457 faculty members, respectively.
15
 The 
percentages of African American and American Indian faculty grew, too, 
but at lower rates, with African American faculty up by 33% to 35,458, 
and American Indian faculty up by 50% to 3,231.
16
 Additionally, another 
study of twenty-eight private institutions revealed that new hires at those 
schools were slightly more diverse than the overall faculty profile at those 
schools, with 12.2% of new hires being Asian Pacific American, 6.9% of 
new hires being Latina/o, 4.8% of new hires being African American, and 
0.6% of new hires being American Indian.
17
  
Although faculties on university and college campuses are increasingly 
becoming more diverse, they still have a long way to go.
18
 To begin, 
 
 
 14. Gose, supra note 8. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Smith & Moreno, supra note 8, at B23. 
 18. See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 133 (asserting that ―the reality is that perhaps the least 
successful of all the many diversity initiatives on campuses are those in the area of faculty diversity‖); 
Caroline S. Turner, Incorporation and Marginalization in the Academy: From Border Toward Center 
for Faculty of Color?, 34 J. BLACK STUD. 112, 112 (2003) (―Research findings demonstrate that 
faculty members of color are, at most, 14% of the total faculty . . . .‖); Sotello Viernes Turner et al., 
Midwest, supra note 2, at 28 (noting the ―continued underrepresentation of faculty of color in the 
nation‘s colleges and universities‖); see also Lori Pierce, It‟s About Moral, Not Market, Values, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 13, 2007, at C4, available at http://chronicle.com/articles/Its-About-
Moral-Not-Marke/46470/ (―[B]ut 80 percent of full-time teaching faculty members are white. Asian 
Americans (6 percent), Native Americans (under 1 percent), African Americans (5 percent), and 
Hispanics (3 percent) remain woefully underrepresented across the board.‖); Ediberto Roman & 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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between 1993 and 2003, the percentage of underrepresented minority 
faculty at ―four-year institutions grew only 2% nationally, from 
approximately 6% to 8%.‖19 In some fields, such as law, the proportion of 
minorities who are being hired into faculty positions is decreasing over 
time. For example, in 2005, the Association of American Law Schools 
(AALS) reported that ―minority candidates for faculty positions bore a 
disproportionate share of the decrease in hiring slots,‖ noting that ―both 
the absolute number as well as the proportion of minority law professors 
hired decreased in 1996–97 from 1990–91.‖20 
Additionally, the combined percentage total of racial minorities in non-
tenure track positions such as contract professor, lecturer, and instructor is 
greater than the percentage of racial minorities within the tenure stream at 
any rank,
21
 which means that, especially now, in the midst of the economic 
downturn, fewer minority professors will be teaching at colleges and 
universities.
22
 In fact, as one goes up the professorial ranks on campuses, 
the proportion of faculty of color declines at each level.
23
 Specifically, the 
proportion of minority faculty in higher education continues to drop as one 
examines faculty numbers from the assistant professor to associate 
professor to full professor rank.
24
 As of 2007, statistics from the 
Department of Education showed that African Americans constituted 6.3% 
 
 
Christopher B. Carbot, Freeriders and Diversity in the Legal Academy: A New Dirty Dozen List?, 83 
IND. L.J. 1235, 1244, 1246 n.79 (2008) (noting that ―less than half of American law schools . . . 
employ even a single Latina[/o] professor on their faculties‖ and arguing that those institutions are 
―freeriding on the few institutions taking the value of increasing Latina[/o] diversity seriously‖); Kevin 
R. Johnson, On the Appointment of a Latina/o to the Supreme Court, 5 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 14 
(2002) (acknowledging the dismally low number of Latina/o law professors in the United States). 
 19. JOSÉ F. MORENO ET AL., THE JAMES IRVINE FOUND., THE REVOLVING DOOR FOR 
UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITY FACULTY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE CAMPUS 
DIVERSITY INITIATIVE 2 (2006). This report noted that, at the California institutions in the study 
(which were specifically trying to diversify), ―URM faculty [as an average across the sample] 
constituted 12% of the faculty, compared to an average of 7% of the existing faculty in 2000‖. Id. at 
10. Here, the term ―underrepresented‖ refers to Blacks or African Americans, Latinas/os, and 
American Indians. 
 20. AALS COMMITTEE ON RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF MINORITY LAW TEACHERS, THE 
RACIAL GAP IN THE PROMOTION TO TENURE OF LAW PROFESSORS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
THE RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF MINORITY LAW TEACHERS COMMITTEE COMMENTARY 3 
(2005), available at http://www.aals.org/documents/racialgap.pdf. 
 21. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS STATISTICAL REPORT ON LAW SCHOOL 
FACULTY AND CANDIDATES FOR LAW FACULTY POSITIONS PRELIMINARY TABLES 13 tbl.2B (2005–
2006), available at http://www.aals.org/documents/statistics/20052006statisticsonlawfaculty.pdf. 
 22. Ben Gose, Diversity Takes a Hit During Tough Times, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 11, 
2009, http://chronicle.com/article/Diversity-Takes-a-Hit-Durin/48732/ (―In some cases the spending 
cuts are also leading to reductions in enrollment and positions for non-tenure-track faculty members, 
which may inadvertently hurt minority students and professors.‖).  
 23. Turner, supra note 18, at 113. 
 24. Id. 
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of assistant professors, 5.5% of associate professors, and 3.4% of 
professors; Latinos constituted 3.8% of assistant professors, 3.3% of 
associate professors, and 2.4% of professors; Asian Pacific Americans 
constituted 10.3% of assistant professors, 7.7% of associate professors, 
and 7.1% of professors; and American Indians constituted 0.4% of 
assistant professors, 0.4% of associate professors, and 0.3% of 
professors.
25
 
Additionally, while there is a pipeline problem for faculty positions due 
to the low percentages of racial minorities with a Ph.D. or with other 
academic credentials, the lack of diversity among college and university 
faculties cannot be explained away by pipeline issues alone.
26
 For 
example, in a study of nearly 300 recipients of all races who had been 
awarded fellowships from three prestigious programs run by the Ford, 
Spencer, and Mellon Foundations, a team of scholars found that even elite 
minority candidates experience difficulty finding academic jobs.
27
 
 
 
 25. U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for 
Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d08/tables/ 
dt08_249.asp. 
 26. See Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American 
Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 547, 555 (1988) (―[C]ontinual chatter among law 
school faculties suggests that the pool of qualified minority persons is so small that faculty 
diversification is impossible. There is reason to doubt the validity of this perception. . . . Enough 
schools have now attained meaningful racial and gender diversity on their faculties to make the 
‗unavailability of qualified applicant‘ excuse heard from racially segregated or male faculties totally 
ring hollow.‖); Olivas, supra note 8, at 131 (arguing that the number of Latina/o law graduates has, by 
now, produced enough of a pool to change the very low numbers of Latina/o faculty in the legal 
academy); see also Smith et al., supra note 2, at 135 (pointing out ―that even in fields with more 
scholars of color, such as education and psychology, the faculty is not diverse‖). Additionally, as 
Professor Lori Pierce of DePaul University has argued, current faculty members of all races need ―to 
take responsibility for the abysmal rate of minority faculty representation by taking responsibility for 
the students who are under [their] care now‖ and encouraging them to pursue a career in academia. 
Pierce, supra note 18, at C6; see also Olivas, supra note 8, at 134–35 (―Faculty in all disciplines 
should encourage promising minority students by hiring them as research assistants or teaching 
assistants, mentoring them, inculcating scholarly values, and ensuring a fuller stream of persons who 
will aspire to eventual careers in teaching.‖). Several institutions have invested in programs that are 
designed to help solve the pipeline problem. For example, Columbia University, which ―already has 
one of the most-diverse faculties in the Ivy League,‖ has invested $500,000 in a program that is 
designed to expose a diverse group of recent college graduates to graduate work in the sciences. Gose, 
supra note 8; see also Smith & Moreno, supra note 8, at B24 (―Doctoral education and the 
development of future faculty members need to be part of the strategy to diversify the faculty . . . .‖). 
 27. Smith, supra note 9; Smith et al., supra note 2, at 136; see also Olivas, supra note 8, at 136 
(―It is a self-serving mythology that minority candidates are ‗flooded with offers‘ when every year, 
qualified and interested minorities are looking for academic work but do not find it.‖). The researchers 
for the study were Daryl Smith, Professor of Education and Psychology at Claremont Graduate 
University; Caroline S. Turner, Professor of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies at Arizona 
State University; Nana Osei-Kofi, Research Assistant at Claremont Graduate University; and Sandra 
Richards, Research Assistant at Claremont Graduate University. See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 133. 
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Specifically, the researchers found that even though the minority Ph.D.s in 
their study were among the most elite of the new scholars on the market, 
few of them (only 11%) were highly sought after, meaning that they had 
―received personal solicitations from institutions and multiple job 
offers.‖28 Even for those candidates, this 11%, being highly sought after 
only meant ―being called by no more than two institutions—often not ones 
that were the candidates‘ top choices.‖29 ―Moreover, the majority of the 
scientists in the study (54%)—all underrepresented scholars of color 
(African Americans, American Indians, and Latinos/as)—were not 
pursued for faculty positions by academic institutions.‖30 The team of 
researchers also reported that 75% of the white male Ph.D.s in their study 
―had found faculty appointments with which they were quite satisfied‖ and 
that ―[i]n most cases where such candidates had had difficulty finding a 
regular faculty job, the fields in which they specialized had virtually no 
openings.‖31  
In fact, studies of college and university faculties and their hiring 
practices have exposed two trends that should be of great concern. First, 
data show that minority faculty members are usually not hired during 
standard faculty hiring searches. Again, because of the biases that make it 
difficult for majority faculty members to view minority candidates as 
juniors who can carry on department traditions or as the most qualified 
applicants, underrepresented minorities are rarely hired absent a focus on 
diversity or other types of interventions. In a study of nearly 700 faculty 
searches at three large elite public research universities, researchers 
discovered that minority faculty members were most likely to be hired 
under one of the following three designated conditions as opposed to 
―regular‖ searches: 
(1) The job description used to recruit faculty members explicitly 
engages diversity at the department or subfield level; (2) An 
institutional ―special hire‖ strategy, such as a waiver of a search, 
target of opportunity hire, or spousal hire is used; and (3) The 
search is conducted by an ethnically/racially diverse search 
committee.
32
 
 
 
 28. Smith, supra note 9, at B3. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Smith et al., supra note 2, at 136. 
 31. Smith, supra note 9, at B4. 
 32. Smith et al., supra note 2, at 134, 152, 155 (asserting that ―successful hires of 
underrepresented faculty of color at these predominantly White institutions are most likely to occur 
when a job description contains an educational or scholarly link to the study of race or ethnicity and/or 
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More specifically, the researchers discovered that: (1) African Americans 
were almost exclusively hired under the three designated conditions at a 
rate of 86%; (2) American Indians were hired entirely under the three 
designated conditions at a rate of 100%; (3) Latinas/os were hired under 
the three designated conditions plus in fields such as Spanish and Latin 
American Studies at a rate of 57%; and (4) Asian Pacific Americans were 
hired under the three designated conditions in addition to searches in 
Asian languages and international areas at a rate of 25%.
33
 Furthermore, 
for each racial group, more women were hired under the three designated 
conditions than men.
34
 ―Indeed, all African-American women, 62% of 
Latinas, 100% of American Indians, 37% of Asian-American women, and 
36% of White women were hired under these conditions in comparison to 
77%, 34%, 100%, 8%, 17% respectively for men.‖35 Overall, a ―meager 
5% of regular hires, that is to say hires for positions without a diversity 
indicator and without the use of a special hire, resulted in the hiring of an 
underrepresented faculty member.‖36 As the researchers explained: 
[W]ithout these [three designated] conditions, the ethnic 
composition of the faculty would have been quite different. In the 
proposed scenario, only .6% of the faculty would be African 
American, 4.7% would be Latino/a, 0% American Indian, 17% 
Asian American, and 77% White. However, while interventions or 
diversity indicators made a significant difference in the ethnic 
composition of the faculty, especially for underrepresented faculty, 
Whites maintained an overwhelming majority position throughout. 
 
 
when an institutional intervention strategy that bypasses or enhances the traditional search process is 
used,‖ such as a spousal hire); cf. Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, New Directions for 
Women in the Legal Academy, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 489, 490–91 (2003) (reporting that their study of 
tenure-track and non-tenure-track law faculty hires between 1986 and 1991 showed that ―[a]ggressive 
action . . . was needed just to assure that faculties identified and hired women who were equal to the 
white men they so readily hired‖). 
 33. Smith et al., supra note 2, at 141–42. The percentage of Asian Pacific American faculty hired 
during regular searches is high, but it is important to note that most of that hiring occurred in science 
and business, mostly quantitative fields, which suggests ―that academic pipeline issues are still critical 
to achieving greater representation of Asian Americans at all levels of higher education and throughout 
a range of disciplines.‖ See id. at 151, 153–54.  
 34. See id. at 146. 
 35. Id. at 146, 148; see also Deborah Jones Merritt, Are Women Stuck on the Academic Ladder? 
An Empirical Perspective, 10 UCLA WOMEN‘S L.J. 249, 251 (2000) (noting, based on her empirical 
research, that women of color were ―particularly disadvantaged‖ on the market in legal academia). 
 36. Smith et al., supra note 2, at 144. 
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Indeed, 65% of those hired with diversity indicators or special hires 
were White.
37
 
In essence, it is generally only when institutions focus on diversifying 
their ranks that racial minorities, especially underrepresented racial 
minorities, are given offers to join faculties. Absent a special focus effort 
on diversity, either through the search or on the hiring committee, racial 
and ethnic diversity is usually ignored in the hiring process. Even then, as 
one important study revealed,
38
 colleges and universities perform poorly in 
actually racially and ethnically diversifying their faculties.
39
 
Furthermore, even though there is an increase in the number of 
minority hires among faculties, research has revealed that this increase is 
largely just compensating for the minority faculty who leave their 
institutions each year. For instance, in the field of law, there is not only a 
wide gap between the tenure rates of minority and majority faculty, but 
that gap is also continuing to grow over time. As the AALS explained in 
one of its studies concerning minority faculty recruitment and retention in 
2004: 
Comparing minority and non-minority tenure-track professors, we 
see two alarming trends—a wide racial tenure gap in each cohort 
and longitudinally, an increasing racial gap over time. Among those 
law professors hired in 1991, 74% of white law professors were 
 
 
 37. Id. at 144–45. 
 38. This study involved research on the Campus Diversity Initiative at several private colleges 
and universities in California. The Campus Diversity Initiative was funded by the James Irvine 
Foundation and was ―a $29 million effort, to help twenty-eight independent colleges and universities 
in California strategically address issues of diversity on their campuses.‖ Moreno et al., supra note 19, 
at 1. The purpose of the initiative ―was to increase the access and success of historically 
underrepresented and low-income students and to build institutions‘ capacity to develop and evaluate 
diversity efforts.‖ Smith & Moreno, supra note 8, at B23. The researchers for this study were Daryl 
Smith, Professor of Education and Psychology at Claremont Graduate University; José Moreno, 
Professor of Chicano and Latino Studies at California State University at Long Beach; Alma R. 
Clayton-Pedersen, Vice-President for Education and Institutional Renewal at the Association of 
American Colleges and Universities; Sharon Parker, Senior Research Associate at Claremont Graduate 
University; and Daniel Hiroyuki Teraguchi, Dean for Diversity and Academic Achievement at 
Wesleyan University. See Moreno et al., supra note 19, at 1.  
 39. For example, the authors asserted: 
[W]hen one considers the sheer number of hires during this five-year period—nearly 1,500 on 
CDI campuses [the 28 Campus Diversity Initiative institutions in the Irvine Foundation 
study]—many would be distressed to know that only 157 of these were American 
Indian/Alaska Native, African American, or Latino/a. Those concerned with diversity would 
be especially disturbed because the low rate of URM hires occurred during a period when 
these campuses had the racial/ethnic diversification of students and faculty as a focus, and 
when approximately one-third of the faculty had turned over. 
Moreno et al., supra note 19, at 13. 
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awarded tenure by year seven, as compared to 60% of people of 
color. The racial gap is more striking for the 1996–1997 cohort, 
where 73% of white law professors but only 47% of minority law 
professors were awarded tenure by year eight.
40
 
Indeed, the most startling statistic from this AALS report was its 
revelation that, out of the eleven Latinas/os who became law professors in 
1996–1997, none of them had received tenure by year seven.41 
Additionally, in 2006, a team of researchers examined the efforts of the 
Campus Diversity Initiative in California and detailed their findings 
concerning the trends in tenured and tenure-track faculty members and 
new hires between 2000 and 2004 at the twenty-eight private institutions 
that participated in the program.
42
 Specifically, the scholars reported their 
findings of an average turnover quotient of 58% at the institutions, which 
meant ―that three of every five new underrepresented-minority hires went 
to replace underrepresented-minority faculty members who had left.‖43 As 
the researchers on the Irvine Foundation Project demonstrated, the end 
result was a revolving door of racial minorities in and out of academia.
44
 
At the same time, the scholars also revealed that the size of faculties in 
general is growing
45
 and that white candidates are receiving the bulk of 
these offers, which means that the proportion of minority faculty to white 
faculty is growing very slowly. Indeed, the Department of Education‘s 
record in 2005 revealed just a slight increase in the proportion of minority 
scholars in the United States over the previous decade—from 12.7% in 
1995 to 16.5% in 2005.
46
  
 
 
 40. AALS COMMITTEE ON RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF MINORITY LAW TEACHERS, supra 
note 20, at 3; see also RICHARD WHITE, AALS REPORT, THE PROMOTION, RETENTION, AND TENURING 
OF LAW SCHOOL FACULTY: COMPARING FACULTY HIRED IN 1990 AND 1991 TO FACULTY HIRED IN 
1996 AND 1997 12–15 (2004). 
 41. AALS COMMITTEE ON RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF MINORITY LAW TEACHERS, supra 
note 20, at 4. 
 42. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 43. Smith & Moreno, supra note 8, at B23; see also Moreno et al., supra note 19, at 10 (noting 
also that ―there was only a net change of 2% URM faculty between 2000 and 2004‖). The turnover 
quotient for Asian Pacific American faculty was approximately 50%. Id. at 11. As this study reveals, 
faculty retention ―requires as much attention as recruitment.‖ Id. at 12. 
 44. Smith & Moreno, supra note 8. 
 45. See Smith & Moreno, supra note 8, at B23 (noting that tenure-track positions grew and that 
the ―actual number of white faculty members grew by about 2 percent‖). 
 46. See Gose, supra note 8 (explaining that ―[t]he increase in the proportion of U.S. minority 
scholars lagged well behind the increase in raw numbers because the number of white and nonresident-
alien scholars also rose during the decade‖). 
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II. CAN A COMPLIMENT BE DISCRIMINATORY? 
As some scholars have noted, the failure to significantly increase the 
proportion of minority faculty at colleges and universities across the 
nation is due, in part, to different forms of discrimination. For example, 
several scholars have critiqued the notion of merit as a means of 
unearthing the inherent racial biases in the hiring process of new and 
lateral faculty. Professor Richard Delgado has highlighted how ―merit, like 
most legal terms, gets applied against a background of cultural 
assumptions, presuppositions, understandings, and implied exceptions, 
most of which operate against . . . people [of color].‖47 Furthermore, 
Professor Derrick Bell has discussed how biased applications of merit 
during the hiring process work only to preserve those in power.
48
 
This Part, however, focuses on what I call ―complimentary 
discrimination,‖ which is discrimination rooted in the compliment of 
overqualification: ―You‘re just too good for us to pursue you.‖ In so 
doing, this Part considers and provides insight into the viability of a 
―complimentary discrimination‖ claim. Part II.A presents a hypothetical of 
―complimentary discrimination‖ against an African American candidate 
on the market for an English professorship. Part II.B describes federal 
courts‘ responses to the employer rationale of overqualification in hiring 
discrimination cases. It then applies these courts‘ analyses to the 
hypothetical illustrated in Part II.A. 
A. What Bidding Wars? 
In today‘s academic job market, it is difficult for Ph.D.‘s and other 
advanced degree holders to obtain tenure-track appointments. All job 
applicants, including the most highly qualified candidates, may experience 
road bumps during their job search or searches.
49
 No person is guaranteed 
 
 
 47. Delgado, supra note 2, at 1726; see id. at 1721–26 (contending that ―[m]erit is what the 
victors impose‖).  
 48. See Bell, supra note 7, at 374. In his article Reflections on Academic Merit Badges and 
Becoming an Eagle Scout, Professor Michael Olivas discusses what he describes as biases in the 
awarding of ―merit badges‖ to faculty. He contends that ―the most exclusionary practices occur in the 
distribution of the highest level of prestige resources, those of the various merit badges earned or 
handed out in the daily business of academia.‖ Michael A. Olivas, Reflections on Academic Merit 
Badges and Becoming an Eagle Scout, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 81, 84 (2006). 
 49. See Philip Zapp, A Job‟s a Job, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 9, 2007, http://chronicle.com/ 
article/A-Jobs-a-Job/46442 (―Jobs are so scarce that even the best candidates are not guaranteed a 
position.‖); see also Laura S. Malisheski, Thrills and Chills at the Tenure-Track Park, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., July 18, 2008, at B32, available at http://chronicle.com/article/ThrillsChills-at-
Tenur/26156/ (―[I]n most fields, the academic market has been tight for years, and you don‘t get much 
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a faculty appointment. Still, myths and legends attach themselves to 
groups of potential job applicants, such as minority candidates with the 
purported right pedigree, right awards and prizes, right teaching 
evaluations, and right publications. One such myth is that these candidates 
are so heavily sought after that they are fighting off offers, drowning in 
phone calls, and deciding between the bidding offers from numerous 
institutions. As data from several studies have revealed, however, this 
myth is not rooted in reality.
50
 To the contrary, highly qualified minority 
applicants often struggle to find academic jobs. In fact, many of them 
experience a specific and unique form of exclusion on the market, one 
based on the compliment of being unattainable because of the combination 
of their race and exceptional credentials.
51
 
Consider, for example, the hypothetical job search of Derrick Kennedy, 
an African American male from Omaha, Nebraska. Kennedy received his 
B.A. in English, summa cum laude, from Amherst College and graduated 
from Harvard University with a Ph.D. in English. As a graduate student, 
Kennedy won the highest school prize in his graduate division for his 
dissertation. He also had stellar teaching evaluations from his days as a 
teaching assistant and instructor. After graduate school, he completed a 
postdoctoral fellowship at Yale University with the number one scholar in 
his subfield, British Literature, and he has a list of quality publications that 
is the envy of his peers and that should easily land him a job at a 
prestigious doctorate-granting institution.  
As a graduate of Amherst, however, Kennedy is committed to 
education at liberal arts colleges and wants to become a professor at a top 
liberal arts institution. All of Kennedy‘s peers tell him, ―You‘re a shoo-in 
for a job at a liberal arts college. An English department at a liberal arts 
college will jump at the chance to hire you.‖  
However, none of the English departments at the seven liberal arts 
colleges with openings in British Literature offered Kennedy an interview 
for a faculty job. They simply could not believe that Kennedy would 
 
 
choice about where you might end up.‖); see, e.g., Richard Riofrio, Inside Man, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., Feb. 8, 2008, at C1, available at http://chronicle.com/article/Inside-Man/45950/ (noting how 
many applications are received for one job opening and how difficult it is to obtain even one tenure-
track job and asserting that he was on the academic job market in English eight years in a row). 
 50. See Smith & Moreno, supra note 8, at B23 (also discrediting the myth ―that in hiring only 
diversity counts‖). 
 51. The impetus behind this Article was a series of discussions that I had with friends at various 
institutions, particularly liberal arts colleges. My friends had become frustrated by the various excuses 
that their colleagues gave for not considering minority candidates and by their colleagues‘ use of 
double standards to evaluate the qualifications of minority candidates. 
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actually come to a liberal arts college over a major doctorate-granting 
institution, despite the fact that Kennedy expressed his commitment to 
small colleges in his application cover letter and that his advisor discussed 
Kennedy‘s preference for a liberal arts college in his recommendation 
letter. These departments concluded that Kennedy must be using them as a 
backup.
52
 
Overall, these seven English departments, even the ones at highly 
ranked institutions, were worried about sticking their necks out to go after 
a candidate like Kennedy. They had been burned before, not by minority 
candidates, but by majority candidates who had similar credentials and 
went to other institutions. For example, one department ended up with a 
failed search after giving an offer to a superstar white male candidate who 
held on to the offer for weeks until he got an offer from his top choice,
53
 
an event that ultimately caused the department to also lose its second and 
third choices to other schools. Another department lost a new faculty 
position, which it had fought hard for years to obtain, after its own failed 
search.
54
 Additionally, although each of the English departments had had 
luck with recruiting majority candidates with Kennedy‘s credentials in the 
past, they each truly believed that they had no chance of recruiting an 
applicant like Kennedy because they expected that Kennedy, unlike the 
―less-sought-after,‖ superstar majority candidates (who, in their view, are 
hurt by purportedly aggressive affirmative action hiring practices), would 
have more offers than he could handle.  
As these departments saw it, even though English faculty openings—
especially in Kennedy‘s subfield—are a scarcity, they had no shot at 
recruiting Kennedy, precisely because he is a highly qualified minority. 
After all, minority candidates with Kennedy‘s credentials are a rare find 
and are in high demand.
55
 The departments ultimately determined that 
doctorate-granting institutions would simply engage in a bidding war over 
Kennedy, one that they would surely lose because of fewer resources and 
lack of comparable research support. Furthermore, they thought, even if 
 
 
 52. See Zelda Rifkin, How We Did It, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Apr. 4, 2006, at C1, available at 
http://chronicle.com/article/How-We-Did-it/46711/ (involving one example of a search committee at a 
liberal arts college that ―weed[ed] out all those candidates [whom they viewed as seeing their] type of 
institution as a backup, in case they couldn‘t get a job at a research university‖). 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. For instance, in explaining why Wesleyan College, a women‘s college in Georgia, had only 3 
minority faculty members out of 52 faculty members, Susan Welsh, the college‘s director of 
communications, declared, ―‗Our salaries are not competitive,‘ . . . ‗and there is such demand for 
minority professors and Ph.D. candidates.‘‖ Gose, supra note 8. 
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they could ―convince‖ Kennedy to consider a liberal arts institution, they 
would not be able to persuade him to come to their particular schools. 
Each of the targeted liberal arts colleges is located in a small town, and 
each separately worried that its location would be an obstacle for 
recruitment because there are so few African Americans who live in each 
town and the few African American faculty members on each campus are 
generally unhappy living in the towns.
56
 
Unfortunately for Kennedy, he believed his peers and subscribed to the 
myth of himself as a bidding-war candidate. He applied only to liberal arts 
colleges, no major research institutions.
57
 At the end of his search, 
Kennedy, despite his stellar credentials, had no job offer or prospects for a 
job offer. 
Each one of the seven institutions to which Kennedy applied hired 
―less qualified‖ candidates—at least based on traditional paper credentials. 
All but one of the final hires were white, with a few who lacked a Ph.D. in 
hand. Four of the final hires were the second choices of the departments, 
with those departments initially granting offers to white candidates with 
credentials very similar to Kennedy‘s. The sole minority hire at these 
schools was Asian Pacific American, but he was already working at the 
liberal arts institution as a pre-doctoral fellow when its English 
Department extended him an offer. 
After his failed search, Kennedy was disappointed and angry. He did 
not understand why he received no job offers, much less interviews, at the 
schools to which he applied. After learning about the credentials of a few 
final hires, Kennedy called his advisor to see if his advisor could offer 
insight into why he was not given any interviews. Through a referral from 
a friend, Kennedy‘s advisor called the Chair of the Search Committee at 
Kennedy‘s top choice school. The Chair of the Search Committee told the 
advisor, ―Are you kidding me? We would have loved to have interviewed 
him—heck hired him—if we knew that he was really interested! But, to be 
honest, we took one look at his CV and determined that he was out of our 
league. You know how all those R-I schools clamor for stellar minority 
candidates. We figured that he would have his pick of the litter. An 
African American male like that!‖ The advisor later related what he 
 
 
 56. See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 135 (―In this context, ‗ordinary‘ institutions believe they are 
not comparably rich enough, located well enough, or prestigious enough to attract the few candidates 
who are in such high demand.‖). 
 57. This hypothetical is loosely based on a real candidate‘s narrative. See supra note 1 for a brief 
explanation about why a law faculty candidate would not find himself or herself in this predicament. 
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learned to Kennedy, who became even more disappointed and began to 
wonder: ―Do I have actionable claims for race discrimination?‖  
B. Too Good for Discrimination? 
The answer to Kennedy‘s question is not so easy to determine. There 
are no relevant Title VII race discrimination cases that address his 
experience with ―overqualification‖ on the job market.58 Furthermore, 
although courts have held that the employer rationale of overqualification 
may be a pretext for discrimination in age discrimination cases brought 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
59
 it is not so clear that 
they would extend that holding to race discrimination in hiring cases 
brought within the academic context. This Part considers the possibilities 
for extending such a holding to the type of complimentary exclusion 
experienced by Kennedy. Part II.B.1 generally describes the standards for 
evaluating the employer rationale of overqualification in hiring 
discrimination cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.
60
 Part II.B.2 reviews and examines the hypothetical of Kennedy by 
using the analyses in these cases. 
 
 
 58. In cases concerning allegations of race discrimination in faculty hiring, the employers have 
asserted that the candidate was not as qualified as the final hire. See, e.g., Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 440 
F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court‘s grant of summary judgment for the employer 
where the employer asserted that the plaintiff was not among the most qualified candidates); 
Sarmiento v. Queens Coll. CUNY, 153 Fed. Appx. 21, 22–23 (2d Cir. 2005) (affirming the district 
court‘s grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff‘s race-discrimination claim where the plaintiff‘s 
subfield was not advertised in the opening, and the plaintiff had failed to submit any evidence of his 
teaching experience or his receipt of grants and had failed to meet the minimum submission 
requirements by not submitting a sample syllabus). 
 Although this Article addresses the viability of a discrimination claim brought by an 
―overqualified‖ candidate, such a candidate would be unlikely to ever file a claim of discrimination. 
The costs of litigation to one‘s career would be too severe. That said, this Article still holds significant 
value in its explanation of the legal grounds for such a claim and, more so, in its potential to cause 
individual faculty members to reflect upon their own behavior during the faculty hiring process and 
how they may or may not engage in racial discrimination as they evaluate faculty candidates. 
 59. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006) (declaring that the statute was enacted primarily to ―promote 
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age 
discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems 
arising from the impact of age on employment‖); see also Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 44 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (declaring that, for individuals forty years and older, the rationale of overqualification ―may 
often be simply a code word for too old‖). 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
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1. On Being Overqualified 
Title VII makes it illegal for an employer ―to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to . . . privileges of employment, because of such 
individual‘s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.‖61 Under Title 
VII, plaintiffs can prove discrimination through either direct evidence or 
circumstantial evidence. ―‗Direct evidence is that evidence which, if 
believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least 
a motivating factor in the employer‘s actions.‘‖62 Because employers 
rarely provide plaintiffs with smoking gun evidence of discriminatory 
intent,
63
 plaintiffs usually work to prove their discrimination claims 
through circumstantial evidence. For example, in the hypothetical above, 
although one could argue that the Search Committee Chair‘s comments 
about Kennedy from one department directly implicate race, a fact finder 
would have to draw several inferences to determine that there was racial 
discrimination based on these comments.
64
 Thus, even for Kennedy, who 
can point to comments by one decision maker that directly address race, 
the likely method for proving discrimination is through circumstantial 
evidence. 
In 1973, the Supreme Court established a burden-shifting framework in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
65
 to evaluate racial discrimination 
 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Amini, 440 F.3d at 359 (quoting Kocak v. Cmty. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 
470 (6th Cir. 2005)). But see Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 
643, 651 (2008) (arguing that there is currently ―a four-way circuit split‖ over the definition of ―direct 
evidence‖). 
 63. Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 182 (2007) 
(―Causation may be proven by a defendant‘s admissions (e.g., ‗I fired her because she is a woman‘). 
Needless to say, such admissions are rare. Alternatively, causation may be proven by statements by 
decision makers that do not amount to admissions, but which nonetheless indicate a tendency toward 
bias (e.g., ‗I do not like women‘ or ‗women do not belong at work‘). As employers become more 
litigation-seasoned, it has become increasingly rare for plaintiffs to discover such statements.‖); see 
also Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination Under 
Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 860 (1994) (―Most employers know better than to 
discriminate overtly.‖); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being 
“Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 
WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (2005) (asserting that discrimination has generally become more subtle);   
Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1013, 1035 (2004) (―To be sure, the discrimination of today is less likely to be as blatant or crude as 
the racism of the (not so) distant past . . . .‖). 
 64. Amini, 440 F.3d at 359 (―Evidence of discrimination is not considered direct evidence unless 
a racial motivation is explicitly expressed.‖). 
 65. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
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claims through the use of circumstantial evidence.
66
 Under this framework, 
a plaintiff can prove discrimination in hiring through three different steps. 
In the first step, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination by proving the following four factors: that (1) he or she 
belongs to a minority group; (2) he or she applied for and was qualified for 
the position at issue; (3) he or she was rejected for the job despite his or 
her qualifications; and (4) the position remained open after his or her 
rejection, and the employer continued to seek or review applications from 
persons of similar qualifications.
67
 Once the plaintiff proves each of these 
factors, the court then draws an inference of discrimination and moves to 
the second step, where the employer must merely articulate a legitimate 
explanation for rejecting the plaintiff‘s application.68 If the employer 
satisfies this burden, the court then moves to the third step, where the 
plaintiff has to prove that the employer‘s stated reason was a pretext for 
discrimination in order to win the case.
69
 The plaintiff may prove pretext 
by demonstrating ―that the proffered reason (1) had no basis in fact, (2) 
did not actually motivate the [employer‘s] challenged conduct, or (3) was 
insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct.‖70 Even upon proof of 
pretext, a jury may still ultimately rule in favor of the defendant if it 
 
 
 66. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (―The shifting burdens 
of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the ‗plaintiff [has] his day in court 
despite the unavailability of direct evidence.‘‖ (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 
(1st Cir. 1979)). A number of scholars have argued that Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 
(2003) will result in the treatment of most Title VII intentional discrimination claims as mixed-motive 
cases and have maintained that the McDonnell Douglas framework is no longer viable. See, e.g., 
William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1549, 1566 
(2005); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet Demise of 
McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa 
Into a “Mixed Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 72–73 (2003); Michael J. Zimmer, The New 
Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 
1891 (2004). But see Matthew R. Scott & Russell D. Chapman, Much Ado About Nothing—Why 
Desert Palace Neither Murdered McDonnell Douglas Nor Transformed All Employment 
Discrimination Cases to Mixed-Motive, 36 ST. MARY‘S L.J. 395, 405 (2005) (―[N]othing in Desert 
Palace hints at the death or even wounding of McDonnell Douglas.‖). Additionally, many courts still 
apply the McDonnell Douglas framework in analyzing discrimination cases. See., e.g., Strate v. 
Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005); Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 
695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53-54 (2003) 
(applying McDonnell Douglas in a single motive case). 
 67. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 
(6th Cir. 1992). 
 68. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–03; see also Tex. Dep‘t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 
450 U.S. 248, 254–56 (1981) (noting that the defendant‘s burden is only one of production, not 
persuasion). 
 69. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803–04; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). 
 70. Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).  
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believes that a nondiscriminatory factor was at play.
71
 The ultimate burden 
of persuasion rests with the plaintiff at all times.
72
 That ultimate burden 
requires proof that the employer‘s actions were, at least in part, motivated 
by impermissible reasons, such as race.
73
  
For discrimination cases involving the issue of overqualification, 
courts‘ analyses of underlying claims generally focus on the third step in 
the McDonnell Douglas framework: proving pretext. Because proof of a 
prima facie case of discrimination is not onerous, purportedly 
overqualified job candidates such as Kennedy can easily satisfy the first 
step of the burden-shifting framework. Specifically, Kennedy can show 
that (1) he is a member of a minority group, African Americans; (2) he 
applied for a faculty position in his field of British literature at seven 
different liberal arts colleges; (3) he was qualified for all the positions at 
issue—as displayed by the departments‘ belief that he, an African 
American male, was too highly credentialed to be attainable; (4) he was 
not invited for an interview and thus was rejected for each position; and 
(5) the departments continued to review the applications of others outside 
of his group with comparable or lesser qualifications. Similarly, the 
employers, the English departments at the targeted seven institutions, can 
easily satisfy their minimal burden of merely articulating a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Kennedy
74—their honestly held 
belief that he would be unattainable. 
The stumbling block for plaintiffs and courts in general (and in this 
particular case), then, occurs during the pretext stage. Overall, while an 
employer‘s unwillingness to consider and hire an overqualified applicant 
 
 
 71. See St. Mary‘s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (holding that a plaintiff who 
proves pretext in the third stage does not necessarily win because the fact finders may still find that 
there was no discrimination). As Professor Martin Katz has explained: 
If the defendant‘s proffered reason is wrong, the factfinder can conclude either that the 
defendant lied or that the defendant made a good faith mistake (a nondiscriminatory reason). 
Or if the defendant lied, the factfinder can conclude that the lie was either a cover-up or a lie 
for a benign reason (a second possible nondiscriminatory reason). Or, if the defendant 
engaged in a cover-up, the factfinder can conclude that what was being covered up was either 
a discriminatory motivation or a nondiscriminatory one (a third possible nondiscriminatory 
reason). 
Katz, supra note 63, at 172. ―The[se] presumptions and shifting burdens are merely an aid—not ends 
in themselves.‖ Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 130 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 72. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. 
 73. See Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).  
 74. Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir. 1983) (―It is important to 
bear in mind, however, that the defendant‘s burden of rebuttal is exceedingly light; ‗the defendant need 
not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons . . . .‘‖ (quoting Burdine, 
450 U.S. at 254–55)). 
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may appear illogical at first glance,
75
 it certainly is not irrational and thus 
cannot in itself serve as determinative proof of pretext. As numerous 
courts have recognized, there are many reasons why an employer may not 
want to hire an overqualified applicant for a job.
76
 After all, running a 
business or organization requires more than simply hiring employees who 
are capable of performing their assigned tasks. Employers also have to 
consider workplace morale, work satisfaction among employees, and the 
retention of employees.
77
 Specifically, employers may want to avoid hiring 
an overqualified job applicant for fear that the employee may leave for a 
more desirable job shortly thereafter or to avoid expending resources to 
investigate and recruit someone who will not accept.
78
 
These same considerations (and others) come into play during faculty 
searches at colleges and universities. For example, departments may not 
want to offer a position to an ―overqualified‖ candidate if they fear that he 
or she will simply hold onto the offer until a better one comes along, 
leaving them with no available backups and a failed search.
79
 Likewise, 
departments may worry about a candidate who is seeking an offer from 
them for the sole purpose of negotiating better packages with the 
candidate‘s first choice institution. Additionally, few departments want to 
invest the time and resources in training and mentoring a young faculty 
member, only to have him or her leave a year or two later for ―greener 
pastures.‖ 
While conceding that employers have a variety of considerations in 
running a business or organization, courts have nevertheless 
 
 
 75. Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1991) (―Since overqualified is defined as 
having more education, training or experience than a job calls for, a ruling that overqualified means 
unqualified is a non sequitur.‖ (citation omitted)). 
 76. See Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 933 F.2d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 1991) (Altimari, J., 
concurring) (―[I]n reality an employer may have legitimate reasons for declining to employ 
overqualified individuals.‖); Woody v. St. Clair County Comm‘n, 885 F.2d 1557, 1561 (11th Cir. 
1989) (judicially noting ―that people are often turned away from employment because they are ‗over-
qualified‘‖); cf. Taggart, 924 F.2d 43 (asserting that ―[a]n employer might reasonably believe that an 
overqualified candidate—where that term is applied to a younger person—will continue to seek 
employment more in keeping with his or her background and training‖); see, e.g., Bay v. Times Mirror 
Magazines, Inc., 936 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that the employer could refuse to hire the 
plaintiff on the ground that he was overqualified where the plaintiff had expressed dissatisfaction with 
the downgraded position). 
 77. See Binder, 933 F.2d at 194 (Altimari, J., concurring) (―Certainly, an employer might 
reasonably determine that placing an ‗overqualified‘ individual in a particular position would . . . 
demoralize the individual and engender frustration, low morale and poor job performance.‖).  
 78. See Gumbs v. Hall, 51 F. Supp. 2d 275, 282 (W.D.N.Y. 1999), aff‟d, 205 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir. 
2000) (identifying fear that an employee ―will not remain with the company for long‖ as one reason 
for not hiring an overqualified applicant). 
 79. See, e.g., Rifkin, supra note 52, at C4. 
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acknowledged that, for some employers, the rationale of overqualification 
may simply be a subterfuge for discriminatory motives.
80
 Moreover, 
during faculty searches, hiring committees might not even bother to 
discuss what exact fears are communicated by their determination of an 
applicant as overqualified. A search committee may skip the step where its 
members discuss what they think might or will happen if they interview, 
make an offer to, or hire a candidate they deem overqualified. In this way, 
the label ―overqualified‖ becomes a placeholder—an unelaborated 
justification for exclusion that requires no further discussion. 
Indeed, several courts have recognized how the rationale of 
overqualification can serve as a pretext for discrimination in age-related 
cases. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed in 
EEOC v. Insurance Co. of North America
81
 that the ―rejection of 
overqualified job applicants . . . can function as a proxy for age 
discrimination.‖82 The court explained that, without any objective content 
in the criteria, ―‗this criterion [of overqualification] . . . allow[s] the 
employer to shift the standard at its pleasure, raising the standard for some 
applicants and lowering it for others.‘‖83 Similarly, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals outright rejected the overqualification defense in an age-
discrimination case by discounting the employer‘s rationale that the 
overqualified applicant would not be challenged by his work and thus 
would seek other employment.
84
 The court reasoned that the rationale did 
―not comfortably fit those in the age group the statute protects [because] 
for them loss of employment late in life ordinarily is devastating 
economically as well as emotionally. Instead, an older applicant [who] is 
hired is quite unlikely to continue to seek other mostly non-existent 
employment opportunities.‖85 
2. On Rejecting Compliments 
For his race discrimination claim, however, the hypothetical candidate, 
Kennedy, cannot rely on the reasoning used in age discrimination cases to 
 
 
 80. See infra note 82. 
 81. 49 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995) 
 82. EEOC, 49 F.3d at 1420–21 (9th Cir. 1995); see also id. at 1421 (explaining how the court in 
Taggart described the term ―overqualified‖ as a euphemism for ―too old‖). 
 83. EEOC, 49 F.3d at 1421 (quoting Stein v. National City Bank, 942 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 
1991)). 
 84. Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 85. Id. at 47–48 (―Denying employment to an older job applicant because he or she had too much 
experience, training or education is simply to employ a euphemism to mask the real reason for refusal, 
namely, in the eyes of the employer the applicant is too old.‖). 
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debunk the overqualification rationale during the proof-of-pretext stage of 
his case. Unlike with age, there is no clear reason to believe that reference 
to a candidate as ―overqualified‖ is a code word for the purposeful 
exclusion of racial minorities. As the Fifth Circuit reasoned in one race 
discrimination lawsuit that involved the defense of overqualification, there 
is ―no reason to believe that a person‘s race would make him any more or 
less likely to seek other opportunities more equivalent to his prior 
positions.‖86 The fact is that overqualified white candidates can and do 
suffer from the same type of exclusion on the job market. Furthermore, the 
type of exclusion that candidates such as Kennedy experience on the 
academic job market is not the type of exclusion that Congress envisioned 
when it enacted Title VII. At that time, legislators envisioned exclusion 
based on the dislike of racial minorities or negative stereotypes and myths 
about racial minorities.
87
 Kennedy‘s exclusion, on the other hand, is based, 
in part, on high praise of his credentials. Or it may be that courts simply 
find it hard to imagine a minority candidate as too qualified.  
However, the fact that Kennedy‘s exclusion from interviewing pools 
was not based on an intent to exclude racial minorities should not preclude 
an understanding of his experiences as a unique form of discrimination. 
Although rooted in a positive evaluation of Kennedy as a faculty 
candidate, the various departments‘ decisions to exclude him from the 
pool of interviewees were due to his racial background. Specifically, the 
decisions were grounded in a racial myth—the myth of the highly 
qualified minority candidate who is engaged in bidding wars between 
institutions.
88
 But for his race, Kennedy may have been offered an 
interview and job in some of these departments, much like a few of his 
white superstar counterparts were. Indeed, even under a Title VII mixed-
motive analysis, the liberal arts colleges here could be held liable for race 
discrimination. The Supreme Court first recognized mixed-motive claims 
under Title VII in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
89
 There, the Supreme 
Court held that where an employer has both a legitimate and an 
 
 
 86. Barnes v. Ergon Refining, Inc., No. 93-7375, 1994 WL 574190, at *4 n.11 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 
1994); see also Timmerman v. IAS Claim Servs., Inc., No. 3-96-CV-0016-R, 1997 WL 279783, at *3 
(N.D. Tex. May 19, 1997), aff‟d, No. 97-10655, 1998 WL 110078 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 1998) (noting that 
the plaintiff cited ―no cases in opposition to summary judgment that indicate ‗overqualification‘ is a 
pretext to race discrimination‖). 
 87. See Devon Carbado, Catherine Fisk & Mitu Gulati, After Inclusion, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 83, 88 (2008) (―Employment discrimination today is not what it was when Congress passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.‖). 
 88. See Smith, supra note 9, at B3 (detailing the results of her study that showed that elite 
minority Ph.D.‘s ―still must struggle to find positions‖). 
 89. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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illegitimate reason for the challenged employment action, the employer 
can utilize the ―same decision‖ defense to avoid liability by proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action 
anyway.
90
 Here, however, the liberal arts colleges would experience 
difficulty proving the ―same decision‖ defense. Absent a showing that the 
colleges had also refused to interview white superstar candidates, they 
would not be able to show that they would have reached the same decision 
on Kennedy despite their racial considerations. 
Furthermore, in determining whether Kennedy‘s claim is actionable, it 
should not matter that the myth carried with it a positive racial stereotype. 
The consequence for Kennedy, regardless of whether the stereotype was 
positive or negative, was the same: no interviews and thus no job offers or 
prospects. All that should matter is that the decision makers deliberately 
excluded him based on a racial stereotype.
91
  
In this sense, Kennedy‘s case is distinguishable from cases where 
courts have found the articulated reason of overqualification to be a 
 
 
 90. See id. at 258. Though Price Waterhouse initially established the framework for a mixed-
motive claim, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 altered the mixed-motive framework. First, the Act allowed 
the plaintiff to demonstrate an unfair employment practice by showing that ―race . . . was a motivating 
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.‖ 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(m) (2006). Second, while proving race as a motivating factor establishes an unfair 
employment practice, if the employer can establish a ―same decision‖ defense, a court may not award 
damages to the plaintiff or require ―admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment . . . .‖ 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). Additionally, the Supreme Court‘s dicta in the recent ADEA 
case, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009), generally called into question the 
continuing validity of Price Waterhouse‟s burden-shifting framework, whereby the ―burden of 
persuasion shifted in alleged mixed-motives Title VII claims.‖ Id. at 2351. The Court noted that, 
―[w]hatever the deficiencies of Price Waterhouse in retrospect, it has become evident in the years 
since that case was decided that its burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply,‖ leaving open the 
question of whether that framework is still ―doctrinally sound.‖ Id. at 2352. 
 91. Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 61 (1st Cir. 1999) (―The concept of 
‗stereotyping‘ includes not only simple beliefs such as ‗women are not aggressive‘ but also a host of 
more subtle cognitive phenomena which can skew perceptions and judgments. Price Waterhouse 
highlighted one such phenomenon: the tendency of ‗unique‘ employees (that is, single employees 
belonging to a protected class, such as a single female or a single minority in the pool of employees) to 
be evaluated more harshly in a subjective evaluation process.‖). In a portion of the decision that was 
upheld by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse, the D.C. Circuit reasoned: 
In keeping with [Title VII‘s remedial] purpose, the Supreme Court has never applied the 
concept of intent so as to excuse an artificial, gender-based employment barrier simply 
because the employer involved did not harbor the requisite degree of ill-will towards the 
person in question. As the evidentiary framework established in McDonnell Douglas makes 
clear, the requirement[] of discriminatory motive in disparate treatment cases does not 
function as a ―state of mind‖ element, but as a method of ensuring that only those arbitrary or 
artificial employment barriers that are related to an employee or applicant‘s race, sex, 
religion, or national origin are eliminated.  
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 468–69 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev‟d on other grounds 490 
U.S. 228 (1989).  
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neutral, not a pretextual, reason for discrimination. For example, in the 
age-discrimination case of EEOC v. Insurance Co. of North America,
92
 the 
employer refused to hire the plaintiff Richard Pugh in the position of loss 
control representative, even though he had thirty years experience in loss 
control and engineering.
93
 Instead, the employer ―hired a twenty-eight-
year-old woman, with no loss control experience, from outside the pool of 
applicants who responded to its job advertisement.‖94 The employer 
explained that it rejected Pugh‘s application because he was overqualified, 
―had too much training and experience,‖ and, as a result, would ―delve[] 
too deeply into accounts,‖ which ―could consume too much of the 
insureds‘ time.‖95 Noting that the employer‘s reason for rejecting Pugh 
was ―objective and non-age-related,‖ the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court‘s decision to grant summary judgment for the employer.96 In 
Kennedy‘s case, however, the departments‘ reason for rejecting him for an 
interview was not neutral or unrelated to race. In fact, the decision not to 
interview him was based on a belief of his unattainability as a faculty 
member precisely because of his minority status, coupled with his 
exceptional credentials. Indeed, as the hypothetical in Part II.A reveals, a 
number of the schools considered and interviewed white candidates with 
credentials comparable to Kennedy‘s and even extended offers to those 
candidates—likely because of the belief that they, though highly sought 
after as well, would not be as highly sought after as Kennedy because they 
are white and do not benefit from affirmative action. In this sense, 
Kennedy‘s discrimination claim is born, ironically, from efforts to remedy 
past discrimination or, more pointedly, from the proven misperception that 
minority faculty candidates are receiving numerous quality offers, or even 
offers at all, because of these efforts.  
Although it is true that summary judgment has been granted where the 
employer has undergone past experiences with overqualified workers who 
have left for better jobs or because of lower pay and less responsibility,
97
 
such holdings alone cannot preclude viable causes of action from minority 
candidates such as Kennedy. The relevant question in cases such as 
 
 
 92. 49 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 93. Id. at 1419. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1421. 
 97. See, e.g., Barnes v. Ergon Refining, Inc., No. 93-7375, 1994 WL 574190, at *4–5 (5th Cir. 
Oct. 4, 1994) (acknowledging that summary judgment has been granted where the employer 
―introduced evidence of its unsatisfactory experience with other overqualified applicants‖ and 
asserting that such experience provided an objective basis for the challenged conduct).  
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Kennedy‘s is not whether the employer‘s speculations and, thus, decisions 
are rooted in any real experience, but rather whether those decisions are 
motivated by racial stereotype. Are the faculties‘ decisions grounded in the 
stereotype of the minority bidding-war candidate? Are the faculties 
treating superstar minority candidates differently by not interviewing them 
but interviewing majority candidates with similar credentials? Faculties do 
have a right to make predictions on attainability based on their past 
experiences, but such predictions cannot be influenced by racial 
considerations.  
Moreover, acknowledgement of the viability of ―overqualified‖ race 
discrimination claims does not mean that such plaintiffs will automatically 
win their lawsuits. Circumstantial discrimination cases are difficult to 
prove in general,
98
 and faculty-hiring-discrimination cases are even harder 
to prove given the many factors, especially subjective factors, that go into 
interviewing and hiring determinations. As many courts have noted, an 
employer has wide discretion in deciding whom it will hire so long as its 
hiring decisions are not based on impermissible considerations.
99
 Although 
courts‘ suspicions may tend to go up when defendants offer ―excessively 
 
 
98. McDonnell Douglas itself is premised on the notion that it is difficult for plaintiffs to prove 
circumstantial cases. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801–02 (1973); see also Ann 
C. McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible Intrusion of After-Acquired Evidence in Title 
VII Litigation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 145, 151 n.34 (1993) (―The Court has recognized that it is very 
difficult for a plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent by circumstantial evidence.‖); Gabrielle R. 
Lamarche, Note, State of Employment Discrimination After Hicks, 32 SUFFOLK L. REV. 107, 111–12 
(1998) (―Most employees find it difficult to prove employment discrimination because many variables 
may affect employment decisions. To complicate matters further, direct evidence of discriminatory 
intent by an employer rarely exists. As a result, plaintiffs must often rely upon circumstantial evidence 
to prove employment discrimination. To facilitate the use of circumstantial evidence, the Supreme 
Court created the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme which allows employees to prove employment 
discrimination using circumstantial evidence.‖); Kristen T. Saam, Note, Rewarding Employers‟ Lies: 
Making Intentional Discrimination Under Title VII Harder to Prove, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 707 
(1995) (―In considering what would be enough evidence for the finding of discrimination, it is 
important to note that the Supreme Court is well aware that there is rarely eyewitness evidence of 
discrimination. Undoubtedly that is the precise reason why the Supreme Court created the triumvirate 
evidentiary stages in its opinions in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. The necessity of relying on 
circumstantial or indirect evidence is due to the employee‘s inability to get inside the decision-maker‘s 
mind to determine what his intent is in making employment decisions.‖). 
 99. See Kahn v. United States Secretary of Labor, 64 F.3d 271, 391 (7th Cir. 1995) (―In other 
words, an employer may refuse to hire an employee for good reasons, bad reasons, reasons based on 
erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its actions are not based on discriminatory 
purposes.‖); Lewis-Webb v. Qualico Steel Co., 929 F. Supp. 385, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1996), aff‟d, 113 
F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Ruby v. Springfield R-12 Pub. Sch. Dist., 76 F.3d 909, 912 n.7 
(8th Cir. 1996) (asserting that courts do not ―‗sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an 
entity‘s business decisions‘‖ (quoting Krenik v. County of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 960 (8th Cir. 
1995))); Timmerman v. IAS Claim Servs., Inc., No. 3-96-CV-0016-R, 1997 WL 279783, at *3 (N.D. 
Tex. May 19, 1997) (providing that courts ―cannot hold an employer liable for violating Title VII by 
exercising illogical business judgment if there is no discriminatory animus involved‖). 
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subjective reasons for challenged actions,‖100 the reality is that faculty 
search committees reject numerous qualified and overqualified applicants 
for a broad range of reasons, including highly subjective and speculative 
ones.
101
 Thus, in most cases, the court‘s or jury‘s ultimate determination 
on discrimination will depend upon a long list of questions, and not just 
questions about whether the candidate was perceived as unattainable. 
Courts and juries will also have to examine whether the perception of the 
candidate‘s unattainability was rooted in the myth of the minority bidding-
war candidate, whether the employer interviewed superstar majority 
candidates but failed to interview superstar minority candidates, whether 
the employer tried to mask discriminatory intent by interviewing only 
minority candidates whom it knew (through specific references) would not 
join its faculty, and so on. Even then, a number of these questions will be 
further complicated by courts‘ rigid definitions of ―similarly situated‖ 
individuals or comparators.
102
 
Finally, recognizing Kennedy‘s claim as actionable will not open up 
the floodgates of litigation by faculty applicants, including white 
applicants. As noted above, institutions may legitimately exclude 
candidates based upon their perceived overqualification. There are many 
good reasons for doing so.
103
 Thus, white applicants who are not included 
in finalist pools because they are perceived as being impossible to recruit 
(without regard to their race) would not have viable race-discrimination 
claims under Title VII. Title VII precludes only actions rooted in or 
occurring because of race. Where white candidates are excluded because 
of perceived overqualification, that perception tends to be based upon their 
credentials alone or on other non-race-related factors, such as the 
institution‘s location. On the other hand, because the view of Kennedy as a 
candidate who will have too many offers is rooted in a specific racial 
myth—one of the highly qualified, bidding-war minority candidate—the 
decision to not pursue him is premised upon race and thus actionable 
under Title VII. 
 
 
 100. Katz, supra note 63, at 172; see also Woody v. St. Clair County Comm‘n, 885 F.2d 1557, 
1565 (11th Cir. 1989) (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (―‗We have recognized that such subjective procedures 
can lead to racial discrimination, both because important information may be available only to whites 
and because such procedures place no check on individual biases.‘‖ (quoting Carmichael v. 
Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1133 (11th Cir. 1984))). 
 101. See Zapp, supra note 49 (―Already I have served on search committees that have turned away 
overqualified candidates, many of whom were conducting impressive postdoctoral work.‖). 
 102. Katz, supra note 63, at 183 (contending that ―comparators‘ situations are rarely identical to 
the plaintiff‘s situation, giving rise to debates about the value of the comparators and often precluding 
the use of such evidence‖).  
 103. See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text. 
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III. COMPLEMENTING DISCRIMINATION 
Complimentary discrimination against overqualified candidates (such 
as Kennedy) causes more than just injury to those candidates alone. While 
many faculties may view the superstar minority candidate as difficult to 
recruit and thus not worth the time and effort of including him or her in 
their hiring processes, they also tend to view such minority candidates as 
the only minority candidates worthy of hire. As a result, it can be difficult 
for minorities who do not have traditional credentials, or even those with 
just less than stellar, but still strong, traditional credentials, to place very 
well on the job market or even enter academia. In sum, not only can the 
superstar minority candidate be excluded from faculty hiring pools 
because he or she is perceived as being unattainable, but faculties‘ dreams 
of one day recruiting such a candidate can often function as an excuse for 
not ―settling‖ for minority candidates who are less qualified (at least on 
paper), but clearly well-qualified for employment. Moreover, resistance to 
these lesser but well-qualified minority candidates occurs even when 
majority members of the faculty have equal or lesser qualifications to 
those candidates or when the faculty has decided to give an offer to a 
majority candidate with similar qualifications.
104
 
A. Risky Business? 
Faculties‘ reasons for not hiring those minority candidates who are not 
superstars but are nonetheless objectively qualified vary. For some 
faculties, while they generally do not want any of their junior faculty to 
fail in achieving tenure, they especially do not want to ―risk‖ having a 
 
 
 104. See Merritt, supra note 35, at 252 (reporting her finding that ―men were significantly more 
likely than women to be hired at higher ranks and to teach different subjects—even when men and 
women had identical credentials‖). As Professor Michael Olivas has surmised, ―for most schools, 
white candidates with good (but not sterling) credentials are routinely considered.‖ Olivas, supra note 
8, at 133; see also Delgado, supra note 2, at 1725–26 (contending that, generally speaking, a minority 
and white candidate with the exact same qualifications are ―equal only if you arbitrarily decide that 
overcoming disadvantage is not a component of merit‖). Professors Deborah Merritt and Barbara 
Reskin once made the following observation based upon their empirical research: 
First, we need to preserve and even strengthen affirmative action. Our research suggests that 
affirmative action was necessary simply to enable equally qualified women, especially 
women of color, to get jobs on law faculties. We need to help our colleagues understand the 
unconscious biases that still taint everyone‘s decision making and show them how affirmative 
action can combat those tendencies. We may have to be more imaginative in the ways we 
construct affirmative action, but we need to maintain that principle and be as aggressive as we 
can. 
Merritt & Reskin, supra note 32, at 492. 
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minority faculty member fail in that respect. As a consequence, they err on 
the side of caution by reserving their pursuit and hiring of minority 
candidates to the purported bidding-war candidates. They fear that a 
minority faculty member‘s tenure failure could result in their earning a 
reputation as an unfriendly or hostile department for racial minorities. As a 
result, they actually end up requiring that racial minorities satisfy a higher 
qualification threshold relative to white candidates.
105
 Other faculties 
worry about potential lawsuits brought by minority candidates if they fail 
to achieve tenure or promotion, even though majority members are equally 
as capable of filing such suits, particularly in this age of rising reverse-
discrimination suits.
106
 Or faculties, because of their own unconscious 
biases, simply may not conceive of a minority candidate as the strongest 
candidate for a job.
107
 
While paths to academia are also very difficult for majority members, 
as Professor Richard Delgado has explained, the opportunities for white 
candidates to obtain jobs with less traditional credentials or even through 
less traditional methods, such as through referrals, are greater than those 
 
 
 105. See Wildman, supra note 4, at 1664 (arguing that ―another yardstick seems to be used when 
women or people of color are measured‖); see, e.g., Olivas, supra note 8, at 132 (finding, in his 
research, that ―the credentials of Latina/o law professors exceeded those of all other faculty hired 
during [that] same period‖); see also Paul v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 809 F. Supp. 1155, 1162 (D. Del. 
1992) (asserting that discriminatory intent may be found where the employer promotes or hires ―only 
overqualified minorities, while failing to hire or promote qualified minorities who would have been 
treated differently but for their minority status‖); Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, 
and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529, 532, 534 (2003) (describing the 
―subtleties that often characterize workplace racism‖ and describing subtle discrimination as ―often 
nuanced, sophisticated, and covert means of differentiating based on race‖). 
 106. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 989 tbl.2 (1991) (finding that, between 1970 and 
1989, reverse discrimination claims were part of a cohort that accounted for nearly 10% of the total 
increase in discrimination lawsuits); see also Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite 
Division of American Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 200 (2007) (noting the 
increased share of reverse-discrimination lawsuits). 
 107. For example, in her article ―How We Did It,‖ Professor Zelda Rifkin (a pseudonym) wrote 
the following about her department‘s search for a new faculty member: ―Some students (outside of our 
department) demanded that we hire a person of color, a suggestion the committee ignored as illegal 
and unethical. We felt our students—of whatever ethnicity—best would be served by our hiring the 
strongest candidate.‖ Rifkin, supra note 52, at C1. As written, Professor Rifkin seems to leave no room 
for the possibility that a minority candidate may be the strongest candidate. She never indicates that a 
person of color could actually be the strongest candidate, asserting simply that her school‘s 
―students—of whatever ethnicity—would be best served by [their] hiring the strongest candidate.‖ Id. 
Additionally, although Professor Rifkin cited the institution‘s majority female student body and faculty 
as a reason for ―vetoing candidates who addressed their cover letters ‗Dear Sir,‘‖ she never once 
acknowledged the value that a faculty member of color could add to the department, whether serving 
as a role model for students of color or as a signal to those students ―outside of [her] department‖ that 
the department also welcomes them. Id.; see also Wildman, supra note 4, at 1659 (describing the 
―cycle of exclusion‖ as being ―unwittingly continued‖). 
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for minority candidates. According to Professor Delgado, minority 
candidates rarely join faculties in the informal way that a number of white 
candidates do.
108
 As he said, ―[t]he net result [of biases against racial 
minorities] is that white people have two chances of getting hired . . . by 
being superstars and satisfying the ostensible, on-the-books hiring criteria 
institutions start out with . . . or by means of the informal route the school 
resorts to . . . when the season is almost over, and the harvest is not yet 
in.‖109 Furthermore, when minority candidates are selected for faculty 
positions, such hires are often attributed to diversity goals rather than 
merit, even when the minority candidate looks exactly like competing 
white candidates on paper and performs just as well or better during the 
interview. 
B. Holding Out for the Dream
110
  
Consider, for example, the hypothetical case of Peggie Lee, an Asian 
Pacific American female from Detroit, Michigan. Lee graduated from the 
University of Michigan, magna cum laude, with a B.A. in Philosophy. 
Thereafter, she attended Columbia Law School, where she served as an 
Essays Editor on the Columbia Law Review and was President of the 
Asian Pacific American Law Students Association. After law school, she 
clerked on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and then practiced law at 
the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division. 
The Fall before Lee planned to become a law professor, she applied for 
teaching positions through the Faculty Appointments Register at the 
AALS website. Although Lee was engaged in an extremely busy practice 
at the Department of Justice, she was able to write a couple of articles 
during her spare time. Thus, by the time that she went on the market, Lee 
had one published student note, one published law review article, and one 
forthcoming journal article. Her published law review article had placed in 
a top-fifty general interest law review, and her forthcoming piece was set 
for publication in a top-ten specialty law journal.  
Lee had a number of interviews at the AALS job market conference 
and received a fair number of callbacks from those interviews. One of her 
callbacks was at a law school ranked in the top fifty in the U.S. News and 
 
 
 108. Delgado, supra note 2, at 1727–28. 
 109. Id. at 1728. 
 110. See Wildman, supra note 4, at 1665 (―‗The point is that any hire outside the white, male 
norm is still controversial, subjected to greater scrutiny, and plain doesn‘t happen without a lot of 
pushing within the institutionalized framework . . . .‘‖). 
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World Report law rankings. When Lee went for her callback at that law 
school, she enjoyed herself, and the faculty liked her. Her job talk was 
good, though not groundbreaking, but Lee showed tremendous skill in 
answering questions after her talk.  
In addition to Lee, the law school was considering several other 
candidates. Three of those candidates were white men of varying 
credentials, and another candidate was a Latino with similar credentials, 
Robert Sanchez. One of the white male candidates, John Shine, was a 
superstar candidate. He had held a prestigious circuit court clerkship with 
a Supreme Court feeder judge and then a clerkship on the Supreme Court, 
had been Editor-in-Chief of his law school‘s general interest journal, and 
had two publications, both very well placed, with another article 
forthcoming. The second white male candidate, Bob Smith, and Robert 
Sanchez, the Latino candidate, each had a circuit court clerkship, editorial 
positions on the general interest law journal of their law schools, and at 
least one publication. The remaining white male candidate, Tom Jones, 
had a circuit court clerkship and had been the Managing Editor of a 
secondary journal at his school; he had one publication, which was a 
student note, as well as a work in progress. Finally, the law school had 
previously scheduled a callback with a superstar African American male 
candidate, Jim Vernon, but Vernon withdrew before he had a chance to 
come to campus. 
When John Shine came to the law school for his interview, he blew the 
faculty away with his job talk. Ultimately, though, Shine withdrew himself 
from consideration when he received an offer from a higher-ranked law 
school. Tom Jones, however, did not excel as much as Shine did during 
his visit. Jones was very nervous during his visit and gave a poor job talk, 
and several faculty members left with the impression, though perhaps 
unfair, that Jones would not be able to become a good teacher. Robert 
Sanchez gave a good job talk, but not a great one, and failed to really 
―excite‖ the faculty about his research. Finally, Bob Smith came in and 
gave a less than mediocre job talk, but responded relatively well to 
questions. Several faculty members noted that, although they were 
disappointed by Smith‘s performance, he came highly recommended by 
one of the leading scholars in his field. 
When the faculty met to decide which candidate to extend an offer to, 
they quickly came to a decision to exclude Tom Jones from consideration. 
After some discussion, the faculty also decided to exclude Robert 
Sanchez. The hiring decision thus came down to Lee and the second white 
male candidate, Bob Smith. In discussing the two candidates, majority 
faculty members repeatedly commented how Lee just did not come across 
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as a good fit for the law school. Others commented that Lee was ―not 
quite‖ Wanda Jones, a former faculty member of color who had become a 
superstar and later moved to a top-ten law school (but who, ironically 
enough, had barely squeaked by during the law school‘s hiring process). 
―Peggie just does not have the same promise as Wanda,‖ they said. These 
same faculty members supported giving an offer to Smith, even though he 
underperformed during his job talk because they thought that he had ―so 
much potential.‖ When certain faculty members pointed out that Lee had 
very similar credentials to Smith and had actually outperformed Smith 
during her job talk and question period, the supporters of Smith 
downplayed the difference in their performances and highlighted Smith‘s 
references, which were stronger than Lee‘s (without any recognition of 
how advantage, privilege, access, and race can influence such references). 
In fact, after a supporter of Lee tried to make his case for her, one faculty 
member even commented, ―It‘s too bad Vernon didn‘t come in for an 
interview. He would have been a good hire for us.‖ In the end, Smith 
ended up with the job offer from the law school and accepted the offer to 
join the faculty. Lee ended up at a third-tier law school. 
Did the faculty make the wrong decision? The answer is not 
necessarily yes. Smith may actually have been the better hire of the two. 
After all, faculty hiring decisions are very difficult, and Smith is highly 
qualified and has tremendous promise as a scholar and teacher. But the 
real question is: did the faculty discriminate against Lee (or, for that 
matter, Robert Sanchez) in its evaluation of the candidates? Arguably, the 
faculty did. As a number of the faculty members‘ comments suggest, 
many of them never saw Lee as anything more than a diversity hire, 
comparing her with a past faculty member of color who had left and with a 
superstar minority candidate who did not even arrive for an interview. As 
a consequence, these faculty members ended up holding Lee to a higher 
standard than Smith, discounting her good performances and not cutting 
her slack for any perceived weaknesses while bending over backwards to 
explain Smith‘s performance. Indeed, they seemed to be holding out for 
the dream minority candidate and judging Lee more harshly because she 
did not satisfy that dream, while never even bothering to hold Smith up to 
that standard. More importantly, they allowed their dream of recovering ―a 
new Wanda Jones‖ as a faculty member and getting a future Vernon on 
their faculty to serve as an excuse for not giving a job offer to Lee. As 
Professor Derrick Bell explained nearly fifteen years ago in his book 
Confronting Authority: Reflections of an Ardent Professor, the faculty 
engaged in the frustrating process of deferring the current minority 
candidate ―for the more promising [though not yet identified] one in the 
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pipeline.‖111 In sum, discrimination by the faculty rested not necessarily in 
its final decision about whom to extend the offer to, but rather in the 
different treatment and evaluation process for minority candidates that 
complemented, so to speak, that final decision and thus completed the 
circle of exclusion. 
Overall, the problem of complementary discrimination is not that the 
minority candidates are not selected for available faculty positions, but 
rather that they often undergo more heightened scrutiny or doubt than that 
applied to the majority candidates. The questions, then, are: Why is it 
important for faculties to understand the nature of complimentary and 
complementary discrimination in the appointments process, and how can 
faculties avoid such discrimination in the future? 
CONCLUSION: AVOIDING BAD COMPLIMENTS  
To answer the questions above, faculties first must begin to understand 
the complicated and subtle forms of differential treatment that occur 
through complimentary and complementary discrimination because such 
behaviors work only to reinforce dangerous (though, at times, positive) 
racial stereotypes and negatively affect the job prospects of good minority 
faculty candidates. Second, colleges and universities need to understand 
these forms of discrimination so that they may increase the diversity on 
their faculties if they truly wish to prepare their graduates for a diverse 
society.
112
 Schools will not be able to accomplish this goal of faculty 
diversity unless their faculty members engage in serious self-reflection and 
analysis about their hiring behavior. As Part I of this Article detailed, 
minority representation among tenured and tenure-track faculty at colleges 
 
 
 111. Bell, supra note 7, at 83. 
 112. See Sotello Viernes Turner, supra note 2; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–32 
(2003) (declaring that diversity provides benefits of cross-racial understanding and exchange within 
the classroom, which better prepares students to work as professionals and function in an ―increasingly 
diverse workforce and society‖) (citation omitted); Pamela J. Bernard, When Seeking A Diverse 
Faculty, Watch Out for Legal Minefields, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 29, 2006, at B28, available at 
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v53/i06/06b02801.htm (―It is crucial for colleges in their hiring practices 
. . . to create an environment where professors and students can test convention by sharing different 
experiences and opinions.‖); Lee C. Bollinger, Why Diversity Matters, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 1, 
2007, at B20, available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v53/i39/39b02001.htm (―[P]olicies that 
encourage a comprehensive diversity . . . are indispensable in training future leaders how to lead all of 
society, and by attracting a diverse cadre of students and faculty, they increase our universities‘ 
chances of filling in gaps in our knowledge with research and teaching on a wider—and often 
uncovered—array of subjects.‖); Jon Mills, Diversity in Law Schools: Where Are We Headed in the 
Twenty-First Century?, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 119, 120 (2001) (―A diverse student body and faculty is a 
representation of the diverse professional world our students will join.‖).  
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and universities remains quite low at many different campuses within 
different regions, even regions with significant minority public and student 
populations. If institutions want their students to think critically and 
broadly, they must expose them to people with different backgrounds than 
their own and to a wide range of viewpoints, which may vary based upon 
racial experience.
113
 As Professor Caroline Turner once explained, ―What 
is taught, how it is taught, and who teaches always affects classroom 
dynamics. . . .‖114  
Additionally, colleges and universities need to acknowledge that 
having a diverse faculty helps to provide a full range of mentors and role 
models for all students.
115
 Finally, colleges and universities must recognize 
how having diverse faculties can help to influence the scholarly landscape 
and research agenda of an institution and of academia in general.
116
 For 
 
 
 113. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 329–36; Rachel F. Moran, Of Doubt and Diversity: The 
Future of Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 217–20 (2006); Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master‟s “Tool” to Dismantle His House: Why Justice Clarence Thomas 
Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 127–29 (2005); cf. Kevin R. Johnson, 
The Last Twenty-Five Years of Affirmative Action?, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 179–90 (2004) 
(questioning the suggestion that there is a twenty-five-year limit on the benefits of diversity). 
 114. Turner, supra note 18, at 116. Professors Daryl Smith and José Moreno also asserted: 
But the desire to reflect student diversity cannot be the only rationale for diversifying the 
faculty. Diversity is a matter of equity in hiring and retention, as well as a central component 
of higher education‘s ability to develop more relevant and varied forms of knowledge. It is 
vital to building relationships with different communities outside the campus and essential for 
creating a work environment that is attractive to people from different backgrounds. 
Smith & Moreno, supra note 8, at B22. 
 115. See Smith & Moreno, supra note 8, at B22 (noting how professors of color ―can clearly play 
important roles for students—especially those in science, mathematics, and other technical fields 
where the lack of diversity among students from the United States is becoming a national crisis‖); see 
also Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Race and Remedy in a Multicultural Society: Affirmative Action 
for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855, 864–65 (1995); Enrique R. Carrasco, Collective Recognition as a 
Communitarian Device: Or, of Course We Want to Be Role Models!, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 81 (1996) 
(arguing that law professors of color committed to diversity should assume a role-modeling function 
for students of color); Placido G. Gomez, White People Think Differently, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 
543, 545 (1991) (noting that faculty of color are ―more than mere role models . . . [that] [t]hey may 
contribute to minority students‘ sense of belonging; a sense that the system may tolerate or even 
appreciate, a different world view, an alternative reality‖). But see Anita L. Allen, On Being a Role 
Model, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN‘S L.J. 22, 24, 25 (1990–91) (―The [role model] argument encourages the 
inference that black women are inferior intellectuals and that white teachers have no role to play in 
addressing the special needs of black students. The quest for ‗positive‘ minority role models demanded 
by the role model argument risks stereotyping minorities on the basis of race and gender, imposing 
upon black women teachers the felt obligation to be perfectly ‗black‘ and perfectly ‗female.‘‖); Jon C. 
Dubin, Faculty Diversity as a Clinical Legal Education Imperative, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 466–68 
(2000) (acknowledging some limitations in imposing role model responsibilities on minority faculty); 
Lani Guinier, Of Gentlemen and Role Models, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN‘S L.J. 93, 99 (1990–1991). 
(explicating how the role model argument can trivialize the contributions that minority women make 
to faculties).  
 116. Turner, supra note 18, at 117 (referring to Shattering the Silence, a book that highlighted 
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example, in law, scholars such as Professors Derrick Bell, Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Richard Delgado, Regina Austin, Neil Gotanda, Cheryl Harris, 
Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, and Patricia Williams, wrote 
foundational pieces in Critical Race Theory
117
 that challenged both the 
substance and style of conventional legal scholarship. Their work, in turn, 
forever changed all areas of scholarship, both legal and nonlegal,
118
 and 
gave birth to other progressive, antisubordination movements such as 
Latina/o Critical Theory and Critical White Studies.
119
 
That said, the task of countering complimentary and complementary 
discrimination in faculty hiring is not an easy one. To accomplish the goal 
of increased racial diversity among faculties, search committee members 
must consist of people from diverse backgrounds with different 
perspectives on how to judge applicants.
120
 After all, diverse committees 
are more likely to create diverse finalist pools, which in turn can increase 
the likelihood of hiring a person of color.
121
 Creating a diverse hiring 
 
 
how scholars of color developed two new areas of scholarship, Asian American Literature and the 
history of African American women); see also Merritt & Reskin, supra note 32, at 490 (reporting that 
three of the most-cited scholars in their study of tenure-track and non-tenure-track faculty hires 
between 1986 and 1991 were African American women, which ―is a striking testament . . . to their 
success in changing the direction of scholarship within the academy to focus on issues they were 
writing about‖). 
 117. Critical Race Theory is the area of critical legal scholarship that ―focuses on the relationship 
between law and racial subordination in American society.‖ Kimberlé Crenshaw, A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 
195, 213 n.7 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990). 
 118. For instance, their work has had a huge impact upon legal fields such as constitutional law, 
criminal procedure, employment discrimination, education law, and international human rights, and 
nonlegal fields, such as women‘s studies, cultural studies, sociology, and history. See Emily M.S. 
Houh, Still, At the Margins, 40 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 481, 488 (2006) (arguing that ―many of the pieces 
collected [in the three major Critical Race Theory Readers] have been important not only to the 
development of American jurisprudence more broadly but also to the development of interdisciplinary 
approaches to the law‖). 
 119. See, e.g., CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado & 
Jean Stefancic eds., 1997); Stephanie L. Phillips, The Convergence of the Critical Race Theory 
Workshop with LatCrit Theory: A History, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1247 (1999); see also Berta 
Hernandez Truyol, Angela Harris, & Francisco Valdés, Beyond the First Decade: A Forward-Looking 
History of LatCrit Theory, Community and Praxis, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 169 (2006) (detailing 
the creation and development of LatCrit theory); Barbara Flagg, ―Was Blind But Now I See”: White 
Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993) 
(highlighting a central feature of white identity, which is transparency or the privilege not to think 
about race, and setting part of the foundation for Critical White Studies). 
 120. See Bernard, supra note 112, at B31 (declaring that ―including persons of color on the 
committee can help‖ with diversity efforts); Sotello Viernes Turner, supra note 2, at B34 (asserting 
that ―[s]earch-committee processes remain crucial factors in fostering institutional commitment to 
racial and ethnic diversity in the professoriate‖). 
 121. Smith et al., supra note 2, at 146 (reporting their finding that ―diversity in the finalist pool 
served to increase somewhat the likelihood of hiring a person of color though a majority are still 
white‖). 
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committee, however, can be difficult if faculty members have simply hired 
reflections of themselves for years and years and if there are only a few 
minority faculty members to take on this time-consuming task. 
Additionally, undoing discrimination by compliment will require 
faculty members to engage in the hard task of critical self-reflection as a 
means of examining to what extent they assist in perpetuating myths that 
eventually result in racial biases in the faculty hiring process.
122
 As the 
researchers of the Campus Diversity Initiative declared in their reported 
results, such self-reflection will not only result in the debunking of racial 
myths, but it will also ―foster a more honest exploration of factors that 
keep departments from hiring a more diverse faculty.‖123 For example, 
faculties could reflect on whether they have hired racial and ethnic 
minorities outside of the three designated conditions described earlier.
124
 If 
not, faculties could explore how such practices, which have resulted in a 
two-track system where minorities are hired only when diversity is a 
focus, reinforce the complimentary-complementary dichotomy. In so 
doing, they can force themselves to analyze and answer why superstar 
minority candidates are ignored during the ―regular‖ process and why 
other qualified minorities are simply not viewed as good enough unless the 
process is ―irregular,‖ meaning focused on diversity. 
Moreover, the benefits of engaging in this self-evaluation can be 
tremendous. For example, a friend who teaches at a small liberal arts 
college told the following story about a search involving a superstar racial 
minority candidate whom she initially opposed for hire in her department: 
During a search a couple years ago, I became fixated on the belief 
that a certain candidate (call him candidate X) was not interested in 
working for our institution. My impressions of him during a 
preliminary interview had convinced me that he was just ―playing 
the game‖ and had not convinced me of any serious interest in our 
institution. As a result, I felt strongly that inviting him to campus 
would be a waste of one of our ―slots‖ for on campus interviews. I 
repeated this impression several times during our deliberations. My 
senior colleague corrected me by saying that my ―sense‖ of what 
this candidate really wanted was not the point and was not one of 
our criteria for selection. He was entirely correct, and I relented, 
 
 
 122. Id. at 136 (―Many agree that it is at the departmental level that most policy decisions about 
hiring are made. . . . Department heads and senior faculty develop recruitment plans and decide what 
constitutes ‗quality.‘‖).  
 123. Moreno et al., supra note 19, at 13. 
 124. See supra notes 32–39. 
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despite my strongly felt ―gut‖ sense. As it turns out, I had reversed 
two candidates in my own memory, so that my impression, in 
addition to not being the point of our selection process, had also 
been misplaced and misdirected. If my colleagues had listened to 
me, I would have prevented the candidate we ended up hiring in the 
search from coming to campus based on a hunch that was mis-
directed.
125
 
As my friend‘s story reveals, critical reflection of one‘s internalization of 
racial myths and stereotypes, including positive ones about a candidate‘s 
range of choices, can result in numerous positive endings. In my friend‘s 
case, self-evaluation not only opened her up (and ultimately her 
department) to considering a candidate whom she had previously viewed 
as racially unattainable because of the candidate‘s record and her 
institution‘s location in a nondiverse community (though she had actually 
misidentified the candidate), but it also provided the candidate with an 
opportunity to physically interview in the department and at least express 
his serious interest in the institution. Most of all, it prevented the 
department from giving the candidate the ―compliment‖ of excluding him 
from consideration for the the open position. Instead, it enabled the 
department to give him the best compliment possible, a job offer, which, 
when accepted, ended up nicely complementing the institution as a whole 
by providing it with a new, young faculty star and a person of color in its 
community. 
 
 
 125. E-mail from Anonymous Liberal Arts College Professor, to Professor Angela Onwuachi-
Willig (Aug. 7, 2008, 5:12 P.M. CST) (on file with author). 
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